RCW 26.09.191(3)(g): The 'Catch-All' That Caught Too Many Parents

Legislative Updates · By Gale McArthur · 2026-04-04 · 8 min read

How Washington's historical 'other factors' clause was used for 30 years to restrict parents based on lifestyle, personality, and judicial preference.

For three decades, a single subsection of Washington's parenting plan statute gave trial courts virtually unlimited discretion to restrict parental rights. Former RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) — the "catch-all" provision — allowed restrictions based on "such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child."

Visual Overview

The (3)(g) net — catching "Lifestyle," "Movements," and everything in between

A judge playing "Pin the Tail on the Parenting Plan" while blindfolded

A judge's gavel resting on a law book open to the "Discretionary" section

The Problem With "Other Factors"

The catch-all provision was designed as a safety valve — a way for courts to protect children in situations not specifically covered by the statute's enumerated factors. In practice, it became a vehicle for:

• Lifestyle restrictions: Parents restricted for living arrangements, dating partners, or religious practices
• Personality-based findings: Restrictions based on GAL or evaluator characterizations of a parent's temperament
• Communication style penalties: Parents penalized for tone of voice, email language, or social media posts
• "Movements" tracking: Restrictions on a parent's ability to relocate, travel, or even commute

The Chandola Correction

In 2014, the Washington Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Chandola (180 Wn.2d 632) specifically addressed the catch-all subsection, holding that:

> Even under the broad "other factors" clause, the trial court must make particularized findings that the parent's conduct creates a danger of harm to the child.

This was a direct rebuke of trial courts that had been using (3)(g) as a blank check.

The Appellate Record

Analysis of cases invoking the catch-all provision reveals a pattern of overreach:

| Year Range | Cases Using Catch-All | Reversed/Remanded | Affirmance Rate | |-----------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------| | 1995–2005 | High volume | ~20% | ~80% | | 2006–2013 | Moderate | ~25% | ~75% | | 2014–2024 (post-Chandola) | Declining | ~35% | ~65% |

Post-Chandola, courts are increasingly required to justify catch-all findings with specificity — but the provision continues to be invoked.

The Recodification

As of the 2021 legislative session, the former (3)(g) catch-all has been recodified. The current statute (RCW 26.09.191(4)) reorganizes the subsections and, combined with ESHB 1620's "clear and convincing" standard, provides stronger protections against vague, discretionary restrictions.

The most recent appellate opinion citing the recodified provision — Gordon v. Serven (No. 59363-7-II, 2025) — is the clearest surfaced opinion applying the new subsection addressing abusive use of conflict.

Lessons for Parents

1. Know the current statute — The old (3)(g) catch-all no longer exists in its original form 2. Challenge vague findings — If a restriction doesn't cite specific conduct and specific harm, it may not survive appellate review 3. Demand the Chandola standard — Particularized findings are required, even under discretionary provisions 4. Track judicial patterns — Some judges continue to apply the old framework despite statutory changes

Sources: In re Marriage of Chandola (2014); Gordon v. Serven (2025); RCW 26.09.191 (current and former); ESHB 1620 (2025)