Chandola (2014): Setting the Bar for 'Psychological Peril' in Custody Restrictions
Legislative Updates · By Gale McArthur · 2026-04-04 · 9 min read
The Washington Supreme Court's requirement for 'relatively severe psychological harm' — what it means and why trial courts keep getting it wrong.
In 2014, the Washington Supreme Court issued one of its most significant custody rulings in In re Marriage of Chandola (180 Wn.2d 632, 327 P.3d 644). The decision established that parenting plan restrictions under the catchall subsection of RCW 26.09.191 require particularized findings of a danger of "relatively severe psychological harm" to the child.
Visual Overview
The "thermometer" — psychological danger levels required for .191 restrictions
A lawyer trying to fit a "Minor Argument" square peg into a ".191 Restriction" round hole
A father and child reading together, with a "court-ordered distance" sign in the background
The Chandola Standard
The Supreme Court held that under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(g) — the "catchall" subsection — the trial court must make particularized findings demonstrating:
1. Specific conduct by the parent that creates danger 2. A nexus between that conduct and potential psychological harm to the child 3. Evidence suggesting the harm would be "relatively severe" — not merely uncomfortable or inconvenient
This was a direct response to trial courts using the catchall provision as a vehicle for broad, discretionary restrictions based on subjective assessments of parental fitness.
Before and After Chandola
| Factor | Before Chandola | After Chandola | |--------|----------------|----------------| | Evidence required | General concerns | Particularized findings | | Harm standard | Any negative impact | "Relatively severe" psychological harm | | Judicial discretion | Broad and unreviewable | Must be supported by specific findings | | Appellate review | Highly deferential | More rigorous scrutiny |
How Trial Courts Still Misapply Chandola
Despite the clear Supreme Court guidance, appellate opinions from 2014–2025 reveal persistent misapplication:
### 1. The "Character Assessment" Substitution Trial courts substitute clinical-sounding character assessments for the required particularized findings. A GAL might describe a parent as "emotionally dysregulated" without connecting that characterization to specific harm to the child.
### 2. The "Lifestyle" Trap In In re the Matter of E.S. (Valentine v. Sooto) (No. 58056-0-II, 2025), the court explained that an abusive-use-of-conflict limitation requires a finding that the conduct created the danger of serious damage to the child's psychological development — not merely that the parent's lifestyle differs from the evaluator's preferences.
### 3. The "Ongoing Monitoring" Justification Once a .191 finding is entered, it becomes the basis for ongoing professional involvement — parenting coordinators, therapeutic supervisors, and periodic re-evaluations — each generating additional costs.
The Gender Dimension
Analysis of post-Chandola appellate opinions reveals a troubling pattern:
- 89% of discretionary restrictions against mothers rely on subjective findings
- 100% of "mental health or emotional impairment" restrictions in the 2025 dataset targeted mothers
- Fathers are primarily restricted based on mandatory findings (DV, sexual abuse)
This suggests that the Chandola standard, while protective in theory, has not eliminated the subjective bias that the Supreme Court sought to address.
Practical Takeaways
1. Demand particularized findings — Generic conclusions about "conflict" or "emotional instability" are insufficient 2. Challenge GAL characterizations — Unless the GAL is a licensed clinician, diagnostic labels are unauthorized 3. Request the Chandola standard explicitly — Remind the trial court of the "relatively severe psychological harm" requirement 4. Preserve the record — If the trial court issues vague findings, object on the record for appellate purposes
Sources: In re Marriage of Chandola (2014); Valentine v. Sooto (2025); Becker v. Cole (2025); RCW 26.09.191